Photo courtesy of Ambassadorial Scholar Lizzy
14 November, 2008
13 November, 2008
Take the second left then stay straight. It's the first stool on the right. You can't miss it.
The new Presidential Palace (pictured above) was commissioned on Monday. They’re still putting on the finishing touches, but according to an interview with the Minister of Information I heard on Joy FM that morning, the President plans to occupy it before the end of his term in office – so within the next two months. This is an election year, and the opposition party has been particularly critical of the structure’s cost. Again according to that same interview, the palace was originally expected to cost $30 million. The Minister of Information didn’t know the final cost, much to the chagrin of the opposition member on the other line.
The current home of government is certainly historic, though not reflecting the chapters in Ghana’s history with which any current leader would wish to associate himself or his administration. The government currently operates out of Christiansbourg (or Osu) Castle, a slave fort constructed by the Danish in the 1660s. After passing through various colonial and indigenous hands (one chief apparently still has the keys to the fort which his people used to control), it was purchased by the British in 1850, six years after the treaty which established their colonial dominion along the coast. In 1948, colonial police fired on demonstrators outside the castle, energizing the nationalist movement that swept Nkrumah into power 3 years later as Head of Government. In 1957, Ghana became the first nation in Sub-Saharan Africa to win its independence.
But why is President Kufuor moving into a giant “H”? The architecture evokes the Akan stool, symbol of chiefly power. In the 17th Century, the Golden Stool fell from the heavens into the heart of Ashanti (The Ashanti are the most populous branch of the Akan ethnic group. Ashanti was a British corruption of Asante. I’ve heard some people here use Ashanti to refer to the territory centered around Kumasi occupied by the Asante.) Upon the occasion of the Golden Stool’s descent, the priest of King Osei Tutu, the Asantahene (ruler of the Asante) at the time, issued laws for the Asante confederation. To this day, Akan chiefs occupy stools, but they do not own them. If the chief’s behavior is found un-chiefly, he can be de-stooled. Interestingly enough, stools are also used in Asante girls’ nubility (initiation) rites.
The new presidential palace taps into a rich history of political and architectural symbolism in Ghana. To take just one instance, President Nkrumah was enstooled as a chief at Nsaeum in 1962. Also consider that chiefly authority is not a relic of “traditional” times. 80% of land in Ghana is held under customary tenure; chiefs hold allodial title, which means that they decide who gets access to the land and its product (usufruct).
As a concluding note, one of my hostel co-habitants was impressed but also a bit disappointed when I told him that the striking building between campus and downtown was the new presidential palace. He thought that maybe it was going to be a night club.
The current home of government is certainly historic, though not reflecting the chapters in Ghana’s history with which any current leader would wish to associate himself or his administration. The government currently operates out of Christiansbourg (or Osu) Castle, a slave fort constructed by the Danish in the 1660s. After passing through various colonial and indigenous hands (one chief apparently still has the keys to the fort which his people used to control), it was purchased by the British in 1850, six years after the treaty which established their colonial dominion along the coast. In 1948, colonial police fired on demonstrators outside the castle, energizing the nationalist movement that swept Nkrumah into power 3 years later as Head of Government. In 1957, Ghana became the first nation in Sub-Saharan Africa to win its independence.
But why is President Kufuor moving into a giant “H”? The architecture evokes the Akan stool, symbol of chiefly power. In the 17th Century, the Golden Stool fell from the heavens into the heart of Ashanti (The Ashanti are the most populous branch of the Akan ethnic group. Ashanti was a British corruption of Asante. I’ve heard some people here use Ashanti to refer to the territory centered around Kumasi occupied by the Asante.) Upon the occasion of the Golden Stool’s descent, the priest of King Osei Tutu, the Asantahene (ruler of the Asante) at the time, issued laws for the Asante confederation. To this day, Akan chiefs occupy stools, but they do not own them. If the chief’s behavior is found un-chiefly, he can be de-stooled. Interestingly enough, stools are also used in Asante girls’ nubility (initiation) rites.
The new presidential palace taps into a rich history of political and architectural symbolism in Ghana. To take just one instance, President Nkrumah was enstooled as a chief at Nsaeum in 1962. Also consider that chiefly authority is not a relic of “traditional” times. 80% of land in Ghana is held under customary tenure; chiefs hold allodial title, which means that they decide who gets access to the land and its product (usufruct).
As a concluding note, one of my hostel co-habitants was impressed but also a bit disappointed when I told him that the striking building between campus and downtown was the new presidential palace. He thought that maybe it was going to be a night club.
08 November, 2008
Election Reflection
I’m sure you can guess which candidate the majority of people here were pulling for. There was an ad in the paper a day or two before the elections announcing a prayer meeting on behalf of Senator Obama. My roommate contrasted the slim margin of victory in the American election with the response of the losing candidate in Zambia’s recent presidential election. The loser, bested by a margin of 2%, alleged that the election had been stolen by “a bunch of thieves.” International election monitors didn’t report any serious irregularities. The losing candidate prior to the election had said that there was no way that he would lose.
I don’ t know that I have too much to add to the general storyline that you’ve been reading. The election clearly has won us lots of goodwill, even in a country like Ghana where the majority of the population was already favorably disposed towards the U.S. Obama’s victory is a tremendously powerful symbol. And the expectations which many Africans have attached to the man are completely unrealistic. In many ways, those expectations reflect an idealized understanding of America itself. Streets of gold, so to speak. Better in every way. In a recent editorial Nicholas Kristof wrote that America is best when it’s not just a place, but also an idea. I agree with the sentiment, but not the phrasing. For people who don’t live in America, America is always an idea. The idea may be that the US is the breeding ground of cultural arrogance and militant imperialism or the idea may be that it’s a place where you really can go as far as your abilities, not your connections or your skin color, will take you.
One thing that is important to add: many of the people I’ve talked have a pretty sophisticated understanding of American politics. The headline of the most popular newspaper on the day after the election was: US POLICY WON’T SHIFT. So there’s still an appreciation that American leaders will privilege American interests. And that’s ok, as long as long as that pursuit is tempered by respect for the rest of the world.
I don’ t know that I have too much to add to the general storyline that you’ve been reading. The election clearly has won us lots of goodwill, even in a country like Ghana where the majority of the population was already favorably disposed towards the U.S. Obama’s victory is a tremendously powerful symbol. And the expectations which many Africans have attached to the man are completely unrealistic. In many ways, those expectations reflect an idealized understanding of America itself. Streets of gold, so to speak. Better in every way. In a recent editorial Nicholas Kristof wrote that America is best when it’s not just a place, but also an idea. I agree with the sentiment, but not the phrasing. For people who don’t live in America, America is always an idea. The idea may be that the US is the breeding ground of cultural arrogance and militant imperialism or the idea may be that it’s a place where you really can go as far as your abilities, not your connections or your skin color, will take you.
One thing that is important to add: many of the people I’ve talked have a pretty sophisticated understanding of American politics. The headline of the most popular newspaper on the day after the election was: US POLICY WON’T SHIFT. So there’s still an appreciation that American leaders will privilege American interests. And that’s ok, as long as long as that pursuit is tempered by respect for the rest of the world.
30 October, 2008
“The Enemy Within” or “Look, Mom: Proof That I’ve Been Reading”
A common thread common running through much of the reading, both assigned and personal, that I’ve digested since arriving has been a sustained, biting critique of the political elite of post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa. The main elements of the attack are as follows. The African state is defined by neopatrimonialism (pervasive patronage). Bratton and van de Walle writing on the “Third Wave” of democracy that resulted in multi-party elections in several African nations in the early 90s, argued, “State elites in Africa have sought political power primarily to obtain and defend economic benefits, to the point that they have blocked private accumulation by independent groups in society thus undermining the entire project of economic development.” Another scholar (Sklar) has asserted that accessing political power has been the primary means of class formation in Africa. African scholars have been no less acerbic in their criticism. Mamdani claimed that the post-independence state de-racialized but didn’t democratize. I think the most damning indictment has been the call for a “second independence.” Petals of Blood and The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born transform this criticism into great, if not exactly uplifting, fiction. My understanding is that Fanon writes along these lines as well.
Why didn’t the idealism of the independence struggle translate into good post-independence governance? First of all, I’m not prepared to endorse such a sweeping generalization. Africa is not one big country. We can’t just pay lip service to the diversity here. At a minimum, if we’re going to speak about Africa as a whole, we at least need to qualify our statements.
But why generally did elites look first to consolidate power and second to development? I know the answer that I don’t like. I’ve read/heard an argument that culture has a role to play in all of this, and I’m extremely wary of that one. The idea is that a “big man” has expectations to take care of his kinship network, and these social obligations are carried into the political realm. This hypothesis was advanced by a student in my sociology class and seemed to be favorably received. I specifically asked, “What do I tell my friends back home when I tell them about that argument and they say, ‘Of course. Africans are corrupt.’ I still have more reading to do on this, but here’s my preliminary answer. Colonialism destroyed and distorted indigenous political institutions, many of which had checks and balances interwoven into them. Huntington also notes that modernization happened in the developing world a lot faster than it did in the West. The rapidity of social change further dissolved indigenous institutions before new ones could arise. Institutional weakness opens the door to corruption.
So to state that response as an answer to the above question: I’m inclining more towards the “perverse incentives” argument that institutions constraining the top echelon of government are extremely weak (in large part because colonialism vested absolute power in individuals at all levels of government) which means opportunities to derive rents (for corruption) are manifold, and the executive needs those rents to maintain power because of the deep, often non cross-cutting cleavages in many of these nations (ethnicity and rural/urban).
This set of arguments should be put alongside dependency and modernization theories, which I will post on soon. So just withhold judgment for a bit. In the mean time read Mamdani, Citizen/Subject; van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis; and Young, The African Colonial State in Historical Perspective.
Why didn’t the idealism of the independence struggle translate into good post-independence governance? First of all, I’m not prepared to endorse such a sweeping generalization. Africa is not one big country. We can’t just pay lip service to the diversity here. At a minimum, if we’re going to speak about Africa as a whole, we at least need to qualify our statements.
But why generally did elites look first to consolidate power and second to development? I know the answer that I don’t like. I’ve read/heard an argument that culture has a role to play in all of this, and I’m extremely wary of that one. The idea is that a “big man” has expectations to take care of his kinship network, and these social obligations are carried into the political realm. This hypothesis was advanced by a student in my sociology class and seemed to be favorably received. I specifically asked, “What do I tell my friends back home when I tell them about that argument and they say, ‘Of course. Africans are corrupt.’ I still have more reading to do on this, but here’s my preliminary answer. Colonialism destroyed and distorted indigenous political institutions, many of which had checks and balances interwoven into them. Huntington also notes that modernization happened in the developing world a lot faster than it did in the West. The rapidity of social change further dissolved indigenous institutions before new ones could arise. Institutional weakness opens the door to corruption.
So to state that response as an answer to the above question: I’m inclining more towards the “perverse incentives” argument that institutions constraining the top echelon of government are extremely weak (in large part because colonialism vested absolute power in individuals at all levels of government) which means opportunities to derive rents (for corruption) are manifold, and the executive needs those rents to maintain power because of the deep, often non cross-cutting cleavages in many of these nations (ethnicity and rural/urban).
This set of arguments should be put alongside dependency and modernization theories, which I will post on soon. So just withhold judgment for a bit. In the mean time read Mamdani, Citizen/Subject; van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis; and Young, The African Colonial State in Historical Perspective.
24 October, 2008
Kick Polio Out of Ghana
On Saturday I had the privilege to participate in an iconic Rotary event: polio immunization. Rotary has dedicated itself to eradicating polio from the world. It has mobilized considerable resources for the effort and perhaps even more importantly brought considerable attention to the opportunity to ensure that no child ever has to lose her life or ability to walk to this scourge. I joined another Ambassadorial Scholar and two Rotarians from the Rotary Club of Accra in a neighborhood of southern Accra for the last day of immunizations. Most of the children had already received the oral vaccine, deworming tablet, and Vitamin A dosage at their schools on Thursday and Friday. Led by three volunteers from the area, we moved from house to house “mopping up” any children who didn’t have the tell tale purple ink stain on their left pinky finger.
I would never have been able to get as intimate look at the communities we visited without this program. At the same time, I did feel a bit uncomfortable at times tramping into people’s homes and looking around to “see how they live.” I have no aspirations to be a poverty tourist. I suppose I can justify my presence there by sharing it with you. Life is difficult for many in these communities. They are literally on the city’s margins, in this case the southern margin, next to the coast. Mothers were genuinely happy to see us. No one questioned the value of the service or hesitated to have her child vaccinated.
I was glad to see that Rotary’s polio vaccination initiative had really transformed over the years into a true partnership with the Ghanaian government. A local government clinic provided much of the logistical support for the vaccination. I’ve been doing research on aid and debt forgiveness, and too often the provision of a key public good like health or education by a foreign or private donor ends up eroding government capacity. Because the government can depend on the private sector to provide the service, it diverts its resources to other endeavors. See van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 if you’re interested. That did not appear to be the case here. The Rotarians whom we accompanied told us that polio has become exceedingly rare in Ghana, the last recorded infection incurring a few years ago.
I would never have been able to get as intimate look at the communities we visited without this program. At the same time, I did feel a bit uncomfortable at times tramping into people’s homes and looking around to “see how they live.” I have no aspirations to be a poverty tourist. I suppose I can justify my presence there by sharing it with you. Life is difficult for many in these communities. They are literally on the city’s margins, in this case the southern margin, next to the coast. Mothers were genuinely happy to see us. No one questioned the value of the service or hesitated to have her child vaccinated.
I was glad to see that Rotary’s polio vaccination initiative had really transformed over the years into a true partnership with the Ghanaian government. A local government clinic provided much of the logistical support for the vaccination. I’ve been doing research on aid and debt forgiveness, and too often the provision of a key public good like health or education by a foreign or private donor ends up eroding government capacity. Because the government can depend on the private sector to provide the service, it diverts its resources to other endeavors. See van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 if you’re interested. That did not appear to be the case here. The Rotarians whom we accompanied told us that polio has become exceedingly rare in Ghana, the last recorded infection incurring a few years ago.
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